Humans and Dolphins: An Exploration of Anthropocentrism in Applied Environmental Ethics by White, Thomas I.
Digital Commons@
Loyola Marymount University
and Loyola Law School
Management Faculty Works Management
4-1-2013
Humans and Dolphins: An Exploration of
Anthropocentrism in Applied Environmental
Ethics
Thomas I. White
Loyola Marymount University, twhite@lmu.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Management Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Repository Citation
White, Thomas I., "Humans and Dolphins: An Exploration of Anthropocentrism in Applied Environmental Ethics" (2013).
Management Faculty Works. 10.
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/management_fac/10
Recommended Citation
White, Thomas I. "Humans and Dolphins: An Exploration of Anthropocentrism in Applied Environmental Ethics." Journal of Animal
Ethics 3, no. 1 (2013): 85-99. doi:10.5406/janimalethics.3.1.0085.
Journal of Animal Ethics 3 (1): 85–99
© 2013 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Humans and Dolphins:  
An Exploration of Anthropocentrism 
in Applied Environmental Ethics1
THOMAS I. WHITE
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California.
This article argues that one of the reasons that the unethical character of much  human–
dolphin contact is not more apparent to ethicists is that discussion of central issues has 
been colored with unintentional species bias. This article points out weaknesses in the 
traditional approach to discussing topics that bear on the question of whether dolphins 
have moral standing. It demonstrates that discussions of the cognitive abilities of dol-
phins by Steven Wise and Alasdair MacIntyre are unintentionally but fundamentally 
anthropocentric—largely because the authors are not familiar with enough of the 
scientific literature about dolphins to draw the conclusions that they do.
key words: anthropocentrism, dolphins, environmental ethics, methodology, 
applied ethics, animal rights
Throughout the last few decades, scientists have demonstrated an increased interest in the 
cognitive and affective capacities of nonhumans, and philosophers have shown a similar 
interest in the ethical implications of scientific findings.2 If some nonhumans can think 
and feel, what does this say about “animal rights”? Is it wrong to use such nonhumans for 
food? To use them as test subjects for research and medical experiments? To hunt them 
for sport? To use them as creatures to entertain us? Particularly pressing is the question 
of the ethical acceptability of human–dolphin contact. Thousands of dolphins die each 
year in deliberate “drive hunts” in Japan. Despite the existence of “dolphin-safe tuna,” 
hundreds of thousands of cetaceans are killed globally by the fishing industry each year. 
Countless more are harassed by ocean noise and military exercises, with some deafened 
or killed. And hundreds are kept captive for entertainment, research, and therapeutic 
purposes and by the military. Given what we know about the sophisticated cognitive and 
affective abilities of these cetaceans, do they have moral standing? Is the way that we 
treat dolphins morally defensible?
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 I have argued elsewhere that the practices in question are unethical.3 In this article, 
I would like to extend the dimensions of discussions about the ethical character of hu-
man–dolphin contact by arguing that one of the reasons the unethical character of these 
actions is not more apparent to ethicists is that the discussion of central issues has been 
colored with unintentional species bias.
 We know only too well that in the past racism and sexism have colored supposedly 
objective research. Science and philosophy have been used to deny men and women 
the treatment they deserve. With an increasing amount of data suggesting that humans 
are not the only beings on the planet who think and feel, our species faces the challenge 
of handling problems of interspecies ethics in a way that is free of anthropocentrism. 
However, questions about whether nonhumans have “moral standing” frequently revolve 
around the issue of whether these beings demonstrate sophisticated cognitive and af-
fective abilities. A critical challenge in such investigations, then, is to avoid the trap of 
saying that other beings deserve moral consideration only to the extent that they are “just 
like us”—that is, to claim that nonhumans have higher affective and cognitive abilities 
only if they demonstrate them in the same way that humans do.4 This article argues that 
thinkers have regularly failed at this challenge.
 This article points out weaknesses in the traditional approach used in discussing topics 
that bear on the question of whether dolphins have moral standing. I demonstrate that 
discussions of the cognitive abilities of dolphins by Steven Wise and Alasdair MacIntyre 
are unintentionally but fundamentally anthropocentric—largely because the authors are 
not familiar with enough of the scientific literature about dolphins to draw the conclu-
sions that they do.
 The significance of this issue should not be underestimated. Ethicists who discuss 
issues involving nonhumans typically base their positions on the metaphysical and episte-
mological implications of the scientific research on the species in question. The cognitive 
and affective abilities of gorillas, for example, speak directly to the question of the ethical 
defensibility of using these great apes for medical testing in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Any applied ethicist who fails to master the scientific foundations related to the species 
in question builds his or her argument on quicksand. Worse yet, he or she may very well 
end up justifying unethical practices.
STUDYING NONHUMANS AND THE DANGER 
OF ANTHROPOCENTRISM
One of the fundamental problems in discussing ethical issues related to nonhumans is 
avoiding anthropocentrism. How do we define the criteria for a specific trait or ability in 
a way that does not predetermine that only humans would ever be able to demonstrate 
that trait or ability? How do we approach the matter in a way that is species-neutral? 
The problem is aptly illustrated by a comment once made by marine scientist Louis 
Herman of the University of Hawaii in defending his use of certain terms to describe 
the linguistic abilities of dolphins.5 He explained, “Some feel that you should use a term 
[that describes linguistic abilities] only if you can demonstrate that the animal uses it in 
all the ways a human does. That’s obviously unduly restrictive. A dolphin might think 
that humans don’t demonstrate swimming ability until we’ve demonstrated all the things 
a dolphin can do, like leaping fifteen feet from the water, staying underwater for fifteen 
minutes, swimming at twenty knots, and so forth” (Herman, 1989, p. 86).
 Herman’s observation should be sobering. If we take the way that dolphins move in 
the water as the standard for “swimming,” not even the performance of the best human 
swimmer comes close. And yet we would not say that this means that humans cannot 
swim. In other words, when we specify the criteria for complex abilities, it is important 
to recognize how differently things might look from the perspective of other species. 
As difficult as this may be in discussing the abilities of other primates (with whom we 
have so much in common), it is much more difficult when we consider cetaceans. In any 
investigation of the cognitive abilities of dolphins, it is important to recognize the sig-
nificance of the dramatic difference in the environments in which humans and dolphins 
evolved—and yet this is precisely what standard discussions fail to do.
Anthropocentrism via the Centrality of “Language”
Thinkers often discuss the question of whether dolphins have moral standing and whether 
their treatment by the fishing and entertainment industries is morally defensible in a 
way that, in effect, commits the human equivalent of the very mistake about which Lou 
Herman warns. Where humans set the bar extremely high, however, is in terms of the 
cognitive traits in which our species excels—particularly language. “Intelligence” (and by 
implication, moral standing), for example, is defined almost exclusively in terms of whether 
dolphins have the equivalent of human language. However, there is good reason to be-
lieve that “intelligence” differs so much among species that it requires species-specific 
definitions.6 Moreover, the absence of the equivalent of human language in dolphins 
does not necessarily imply that they lack sophisticated cognitive abilities. Unfortunately, 
even individuals who are consciously committed to avoiding anthropocentrism have 
made serious errors in their assessment of the cognitive abilities of dolphins by placing 
so much emphasis on linguistic abilities.
 Steven Wise, for example, is a pioneer in the field of animal rights law who has been 
trying for years to get courts to extend legal personhood to include at least some nonhu-
man animals.7 He is sensitive to the problem of speciesism, and he even recognizes that 
“we mustn’t think human intelligence the only intelligence” (Wise, 2002, p. 45). However, 
Wise’s discussion of dolphins focuses almost exclusively on their linguistic capabilities.8 
In addition, on a “practical autonomy” scale that Wise has developed to show the ex-
tent to which some nonhumans deserve legal recognition, dolphins fall below bonobos, 
gorillas, and orangutans (Wise, 2002, p. 241). Wise’s explanations of the higher level of 
“mental abilities” evidenced by the primate research subjects in the scientific literature 
he examined—Chantek (orangutan), Koko (gorilla), and Kanzi (bonobo)—primarily detail 
how well these three primates performed on human tasks (human intelligence tests, tests 
related to assessing the developmental progress of human children, tests of the ability to 
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use elements of human language, etc.). In other words, other primates rank higher than 
dolphins (and have a stronger claim to “rights”) because they are more like us—which, 
given our biological relationship, is no surprise.
 A more serious example of a similar error comes from Alasdair MacIntyre, a distin-
guished scholar who is one of only a handful of philosophers to explore the philosophical 
implications of the cognitive capacities of dolphins. Like Wise, MacIntyre makes a promis-
ing start. He explicitly rejects the idea that nonhumans are incapable of having thoughts 
and beliefs because they lack language.9 However, although MacIntyre recognizes that 
dolphins have a variety of impressive cognitive abilities, he nonetheless makes the fact that 
dolphins lack human language central in his evaluation of their intelligence.10 MacIntyre 
(1999) then falls into the trap of anthropocentrism when he writes, “But although [Lou 
Herman’s research] is unquestionably an achievement of great significance for evaluat-
ing the communicative and linguistic capacities of dolphins, just what the significance is 
could only emerge from a detailed comparison with what is acquired by human children 
and with their mode of language acquisition” (p. 28, emphasis added).
 MacIntyre (1999) concedes that dolphins share with humans a “prelinguistic” ability 
to distinguish between what is true and false (p. 37). But he argues that the fact that 
dolphins lack language means that they cannot have the advanced cognitive traits that 
humans do. Key here are three abilities that MacIntyre identifies as the traits of what he 
calls “independent practical reasoners”: the ability to have reasons for acting other than 
to satisfy present desires, the ability to imagine the future, and the ability to evaluate our 
reasons for acting (MacIntyre, 1999, chapters 6–8).
MacIntyre (1999) summarizes his position as follows:
I first of all noted that part of what is distinctive about human reasons for action, as 
compared with dolphin or gorilla reasons, is that we are able to evaluate our reasons 
as better or worse, and I then catalogued some characteristics that are necessary for 
those who, by exercising this ability, become sound practical reasoners, their ability to 
detach themselves from the immediacy of their own desires, their capacity to imagine 
alternative realistic futures, and their disposition to recognize and to make true practical 
judgments concerning a variety of kinds of good. (96)
In other words, MacIntyre is referring to three abilities that we find in normal adult 
humans but do not observe in, for example, cats and dogs: We do things for reasons 
other than satisfying physical pleasure; we consciously realize that some reasons for do-
ing things are better than others, and we choose our actions accordingly; and we project 
the consequences of our actions into the future. So, for example, we might choose to 
donate money to a worthy cause because it will help other people have better lives in 
the future (not because it will make us look good to other people or simply make us feel 
better about ourselves).
 MacIntyre makes a series of mistakes, however, when he argues that dolphins lack 
these abilities. First, MacIntyre’s argument seems to proceed on the questionable (and, 
it might be argued, anthropocentric) belief that if we cannot observe dolphins perform-
ing these activities in the same way that is recognizable when humans demonstrate the 
abilities with language, then dolphins lack those abilities.
 Second, MacIntyre offers his conclusions with insufficient knowledge about dolphin 
capabilities. Whether dolphins possess language or not, there is reason to believe that 
they do have the three abilities to which MacIntyre refers. The following are just a few 
brief examples.
• Since the 1980s, a community of Atlantic spotted dolphins has sought out human
contact in the Bahamas. Their motivation is apparently curiosity about another in-
telligent species, which strongly suggests that they are capable of acting for reasons
that have nothing to do with the normal physical or social life of their species (Her-
zing, 2011). More prosaically, Bernd Würsig’s (1983) description of a particular
feeding practice documents the ability of a group of dolphins to postpone immedi-
ate gratification in favor of a strategy that rewards patience and cooperation.11
• Research by John Gory, Stan Kuczaj, and Rachel Thames has demonstrated that
dolphins can imagine the future (Gory & Kuczaj, 1999; Kuczaj & Thames, 2006).
That is, the dolphins being studied were able to “create a novel and appropriate
solution in advance of executing a solution” (Gory & Kuczaj, 1999).
• It is obviously impossible to know the reasons behind dolphins’ actions, but it
seems that dolphins have the capacity to choose to act for different types of rea-
sons. They can act out of self-interest (when they eat). They can act to advance the
interest of their coalition or community (when they engage in certain cooperative
behavior). They can act to help not only other dolphins but humans as well (when
they perform caregiving behaviors). They even appear to be able to act out of
curiosity (when they seek out human interaction). Given what seems reasonable
to speculate on the basis of dolphin behavior, dolphins appear to have the abilities
MacIntyre is referring to. MacIntyre appears to be referring simply to an ability
more advanced than what we see in human children. He writes,
The first step in this transition [to rationality] takes place when a child becomes 
able to consider the suggestion that the good to the achievement of which it is 
presently directed by its animal nature is inferior to some other alternative good 
and that this latter good therefore provides a better reason for action than does 
the good at which the child has been aiming. (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 56)
A simple example that seems to qualify is when we realize that there are better 
reasons for treating other people decently than that they may punish us if we do 
not. I believe that caregiving behavior with no apparent reward to the dolphins 
giving it suggests that dolphins act for reasons that are better than the self-interest 
characteristic of human children.
 Third, MacIntyre complicates matters by making a series of assertions about dolphins 
that are either unlikely or, very probably, false—a fact that further undermines his argu-
ment. For example, MacIntyre (1999) claims, “[Dolphins] do not have to go through a 
stage in which they separate themselves from their desires, as humans do, a separation 
which involves a recognition of goods other than the pleasures of satisfied bodily wants” (p. 
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68). However, dolphins regularly appear to pursue satisfactions other than “bodily wants” 
(e.g., curiosity), so they presumably have gone through such a stage. (MacIntyre also 
assumes—without any reason for doing so—that human and dolphin brains go through 
the same developmental stages. Yet as research on the cetacean brain has demonstrated, 
land-based primate brains and water-based dolphin brains developed along significantly 
different evolutionary paths.12)
MacIntyre (1999) also writes,
The care for others that dolphins exhibit plays a crucial part in sustaining their shared 
lives. Yet this part is one that they themselves cannot survey, lacking as they do, any 
capacity to look back to infancy or forward to aging and death as humans do. . . . But, 
unlike dolphins, [humans] also have the possibility of understanding their animal iden-
tity through time from conception to death and with it their need at different past and 
present stages of life for the care of others, that is, as those who, having received care, 
will be from time to time called upon to give care, and who, having given, will from 
time to time themselves once more be in need of care by and from others. (pp. 82–83)
Not only is it impossible to assert that dolphins lack this awareness, but the combination of 
the following facts suggests that they possess it: Dolphins have significant memories; they 
engage in long-term relationships; and they occasionally appear to grieve after a death.13
Following a comment to the effect that humans cannot always depend on others to protect 
us from harm or even to refrain from hurting us, MacIntyre (1999) writes, “Dolphins do 
not have reason to fear dolphins, as humans have reason to fear humans” (p. 97). The 
occasional aggression by members of a community of bottlenoses against the Atlantic 
spotted dolphins in the Bahamas is one example that certainly suggests otherwise (Herz-
ing, 2011, pp. 124ff.).
 It appears as though MacIntyre gives us a classic example of unintended anthropocen-
trism. He is so thoroughly steeped in the fact that humans show we have certain cognitive 
abilities through use of language that he takes the absence of analogous, recognizable 
linguistic behavior in dolphins as conclusive proof that these cetaceans lack the abilities 
in question.14 He also compounds this error by basing his claims on insufficient familiarity 
with the scientific literature on dolphins.
The Problem with Language
My criticism of thinkers like Wise and MacIntyre may seem unfair. Is it not reasonable 
to think of “language” as simply the tool that any being with thoughts and beliefs would 
use when the being reflects on his or her own thoughts, manipulates his or her own ideas, 
and tries to communicate those thoughts and beliefs to other intelligent beings? And if 
we do not see any evidence of this kind of tool, would it not be reasonable to conclude 
that such a being lacks the kind of sophisticated inner world that most humans would 
insist on before accepting the idea that such beings have moral standing?
 A rudimentary definition of “intelligence” can apply across species.15 Why not think 
of language as just a particular facet of higher intelligence—the basic tool that is used in 
processing and working with information? Why am I claiming that it is anthropocentric to 
insist that dolphins (or any nonhuman species) demonstrate at least elementary linguistic 
abilities before they are candidates for moral standing?
 The fundamental problem with making language so central is that “intelligence” is 
probably best understood as a species-specific trait. That is, there is good reason to accept 
the possibility that large-brained species who evolved in dramatically different environ-
ments adapted to these conditions in very different ways—both externally and internally.
 Language is not some magic, ethereal gift of the gods. Language (in the form that we 
use it) is a biological adaptation by humans. It arose and evolved because language was 
useful to our ancestors in dealing with the challenges in their environment. However, 
language—at least in the form that it has developed in humans—may not be useful in 
every set of evolutionary conditions. If dolphins lack language, it may very well be be-
cause it is not a particularly helpful tool in the oceans, not because dolphins lacked the 
intellectual capacity for developing it had it been useful.
The Adaptive Character of Language in Humans
Part of the problem here is that humans generally do not fully understand what we use 
language for. A popular view is that language is a tool designed to let humans use our ra-
tionality in solving the problems that our environment has thrown at us over the centuries. 
Language allowed us to develop science, medicine, law, and other achievements that are part 
of human civilization. Language lets us uncover the mysteries of the universe—to discover 
truth. This view essentially assigns a primarily “designative” function to language, viewing 
it, as Charles Taylor (1985a) puts it, “as an instrument of control in gaining knowledge of 
the world as objective process” (p. 226).
 Although there is no denying what language has let us accomplish through designa-
tion and representation, there are also some alternative perspectives about language 
that deserve consideration. For example, Taylor (1985a) identifies an “expressive” func-
tion of language that locates language in the social context in which it is used. Echoing 
Humboldt, Taylor (1985a) refers to this as “understanding language as energeia, not 
just ergon” (p. 256). In this view, as Taylor (1985b) explores in “Theories of Meaning,” 
language constitutes not only dimensions of the self but social relations as well.
 In fact, primatologist Robin Dunbar (1996) offers an interpretation of language consis-
tent with Taylor’s view. Dunbar has argued that language evolved primarily as a way for us 
to handle living in groups. He has advanced the controversial thesis that language evolved 
in humans “as a kind of vocal grooming to allow us to bond larger groups than was possible 
using the conventional primate mechanism of physical grooming” (Dunbar, 1996, p. 78). 
In short, Dunbar (1996) says, “language evolved to allow us to gossip”—something that, 
according to Dunbar, amounts to about 60% of how we use language (p. 79).
 Dolphins are also highly social, and as I argue elsewhere, they probably use their large 
brains mainly for social intelligence—that is, to manage their relationships. However, 
from the perspective of Dunbar’s theory, if dolphins found nonlinguistic ways to build 
social cohesion, there would have been less evolutionary pressure to develop something 
White, Humans and Dolphins 91
92 Journal of Animal Ethics, 3 (2013)
analogous to human language. And dolphins unquestionably have ways of reinforcing 
relationships and building social cohesion (White, 2007, chapter 5).
Language and the Hand
The idea that dolphins lack language because their ancestors did not experience pres-
sures to develop such an adaptation leads us to one other reason that it is anthropocentric 
to make the equivalent of human language a necessary condition of higher intelligence 
(and moral standing)—the relationship between human language and the human hand.
 One of the most intriguing sources of support for the idea that “intelligence” does not 
mean precisely the same thing when we talk about humans and dolphins comes from an 
unlikely source—the unintended implications of a physician’s speculations about the rela-
tionship between the brain and the hand. Frank Wilson, a neurologist who has specialized 
in the rehabilitation of hand injuries, became interested in  paleoanthropology—the study 
of ancient human origins—and he has put forth a fascinating theory about the relation-
ship between the human hand and the brain. In his The Hand: How Its Use Shapes the 
Brain, Language and Human Culture, Wilson (1998) argues that the character of human 
intelligence—and particularly the character of human language—is largely a function 
of what Wilson calls “the logic of the hand.” Wilson argues that the hand and the brain 
“co-evolved,” with the development of the former driving the development of the latter.16 
He argues that “any theory of human intelligence which ignores the interdependence 
of hand and brain function, the historic origins of that relationship, or the impact of that 
history on developmental dynamics in modern humans, is grossly misleading and sterile” 
(Wilson, 1998, p. 7).
 If Wilson is correct, another reason that dolphins lack some analogue to human lan-
guage is that they lack hands. And this gives us still more reason to refrain from thinking 
about language (in the way that humans construct, use, and understand it) as a trait that 
we can assume is universally a feature of higher intelligence.
 The significance of this perspective cannot be overstated. In essence, Wilson claims 
that the hand, the brain, and language are intimately connected—with the hand enjoying 
logical primacy. In other words, the brain’s abilities were determined by the hand’s need. 
Human “intelligence,” then, refers to a set of cognitive abilities that developed in response 
to a combination of (a) the specific conditions that early humans were living in, (b) their 
successful response to the challenges in this environment, and (c) specifically the manual 
abilities that humans developed (the capacity to make and use increasingly complex tools) 
that increased the likelihood of their survival. From this point of view, all sophisticated 
human cognitive operations are driven by the “logic of the hand.” Consequently, all of 
the products of human intelligence—technology, culture, art, and so on—are colored by 
the “logic of the hand.”
 For the purposes of our investigation, Wilson’s thesis has two powerful implications. 
First, it explains why discussions about “intelligence” in nonhumans put so much em-
phasis on language. That is, Wilson’s theory gives us a paleontological explanation for 
the fact that philosophical discussions of the possibility of intelligence in nonhumans are 
dominated by a preoccupation with language and the linguistic abilities of nonhumans. 
(This is precisely what we saw previously in the discussions of Steven Wise and Alasdair 
MacIntyre.) Wilson (1998) argues, “The partnership of language and culture is so deeply 
woven into human history, and so compelling a force in our own personal development 
and acculturation, that we quite naturally come to regard language as the trait that both 
explains and defines our intelligence” (p. 37, emphasis added).
 Brain expert Robert Ornstein (1991) reinforces this general perspective when he 
claims, “The mind is the way it is because the world is the way it is. The evolved systems 
organize the mind to mesh with the world” (p. 11). Wilson stresses the central role of 
the biological instrument through which this response is mediated. The human mind 
developed in response to specific environmental conditions and survival imperatives. 
Our brains responded as they did because of our nature as handed, land mammals. The 
dolphin mind, however, developed in response to the dramatically different evolution-
ary pressures of the ocean. Their response was mediated by a different sort of biologi-
cal instrument—a body that evolved to be as hydrodynamic as possible. Their brains 
responded as they did, then, because of their nature as aquatic mammals.
 The more important implication of Wilson’s line of thought, however, is what it has to 
say about nonhumans, such as dolphins, who have big brains but no hands. If the picture 
that Wilson and Ornstein paint about the dynamics that drive the evolution of a large brain 
is correct, it is not merely possible that “dolphin intelligence” and “human intelligence” 
are dramatically different; it is probable. Indeed, given the vast differences in the condi-
tions in which the two species were evolving and in the challenges they were facing, it 
is hard to believe that the intelligences would be the same. To believe so would involve 
a naïve denial of the fundamental forces that drive the world of nature and, particularly, 
the evolution of the brain. The question is not “Could human and dolphin intelligence 
be different?” but “How could they possibly be the same?”
 The bodies of ancient dolphins adapted to their environment, acquiring traits that 
would increase the likelihood of survival. Presumably, the dolphin brain responded in 
concert with these adaptations. If there is a “neurological grammar” imprinted by the 
coevolution of the dolphin brain and central aspects of the dolphin body, it clearly is 
not based on “the logic of the hand.” At this point, we can only speculate on the logic of 
dolphin brain evolution, but it seems virtually certain that this would lead to intelligence 
that is very different from what we find in humans.
Anthropocentric Consequences of a Weak Grasp of Science
What we have seen then is that traditional discussions about the cognitive capacities of 
dolphins—as represented by Stephen Wise and Alasdair MacIntyre—are unintentionally 
anthropocentric and therefore inaccurate in the conclusions they draw. Regrettably, but 
understandably, the ethical implication of these scholars’ findings is that dolphins are 
less deserving of moral consideration than an unbiased examination of the facts would 
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reveal.17 As a result, Wise and MacIntyre become unwitting defenders of human practices 
(the deaths, injuries, harassment, and captivity of dolphins in connection with the human 
fishing and entertainment industries) that are, in fact, seriously unethical.
FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF  
ANTHROPOCENTRISM IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT DOLPHINS
This article has tried to show that two important discussions of the cognitive abilities of 
dolphins have been unintentionally anthropocentric. Such flawed discussions have ethical 
implications in that they provide grounds for justifying certain practices that an unbiased 
approach would show to be unethical. Sadly, the reason for the weakness of Wise’s and 
MacIntyre’s discussions is lack of familiarity with the relevant scientific research. Both men 
base their arguments on a relatively small amount of the scientific literature on dolphins. 
By MacIntyre’s (1999) own admission, his primary source for information on dolphins 
was a single anthology of 20 scientific writings (p. 21). Wise (2002) consults a wider range 
of writings (pp. 278–286) but still less than required to offer judgments about the cogni-
tive abilities of dolphins. Wise also focuses almost exclusively on Louis Herman’s work 
with two captive bottlenose dolphins. More broadly, neither writer shows any fluency in 
the philosophical (and especially, ethical) implications of the process of evolution and 
the mechanism of adaptation. In addition, neither has any experience with fieldwork.18
 By contrast, my own investigation of the ethical issues connected with human–dolphin 
interaction began in 1988 and has been characterized by intense study of most available 
research on dolphin anatomy and physiology, brain structure, cognitive and affective ca-
pacities, social intelligence, and social behavior. In addition, since 1990, I have observed 
and participated in fieldwork connected with Denise Herzing’s research on a community 
of Atlantic spotted dolphins in the Bahamas.19
 On the basis of my own experience, I believe that basing philosophical conclusions 
about any nonhuman species (1) on only a small percentage of the relevant scientific lit-
erature and (2) on no field experience is no more acceptable than basing judgments about 
Plato on the reading of only summaries of a few dialogues or the reading of dialogues in 
translation. Indeed, fieldwork is so critical to applied environmental ethics that it should 
be considered as important a requirement for this inquiry as knowledge of Greek is to 
studying ancient philosophy.20
 As I have suggested, the weak scientific foundation of Wise’s and MacIntyre’s discus-
sions leads not simply to incomplete or unpersuasive arguments; it leads to flatly incorrect 
positions that are unintentionally anthropocentric. It is my hope that this article can act 
as a small corrective to such faulty discussions by encouraging applied ethicists who work 
on issues related to environmental ethics in general—and nonhumans in particular—to 
base their philosophical inquiries on stronger scientific footing than has traditionally been 
the case.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this article was published in 2004 as “Menschen und Delfine: Ein
Versuch über Anthropozentrismus in der angewandten Umweltethik,” Deutsche Zeitschrift fuer 
Philosophie, 52(4), 603–616.
2. The scientific pioneer in this area is unquestionably Donald Griffin (1976, 1984, 1992). For
more recent work see, for example, F. B. Wall and Peter L. Tyack (2003) and Edward A. Was-
serman and Thomas R. Zentall (2009). There is an extensive philosophical literature on animal 
rights that began with Peter Singer (1975) and Tom Regan (1983). More recent contributions 
include Paola Cavalieri (2001), Peter Singer (2006), Martha C. Nussbaum (2006), Mark Row-
lands (2009), and Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (2011).
3. See White (2007).
4. Some degree of anthropocentrism is probably inevitable, in the sense that the mechanisms
by which we take in and process information are human. The human body has, we might say, 
specific technical specifications that affect the character of our perceptions and thought pro-
cesses. To borrow a Kantian perspective, we will never have access to the “thing in itself,” only 
the “thing as it appears.” However, there is a kind of anthropocentrism grounded in irrational bias 
that can be overcome, and that is the topic of this article. I am referring to something analogous 
to racism and sexism (prejudicial outlooks that interpret facts through the lens of a belief in the 
innate superiority of one group over all others) that is grounded in the preconceived idea that 
only humans can have advanced cognitive and affective capacities.
5. Herman did extensive research on the abilities of two captive bottlenose dolphins to un-
derstand artificial human languages. See, for example, Herman, Richards, and Wolz (1984); 
Herman (1984); Herman, Pack, and Morrel-Samuels (1993); Herman, Kuczaj II, and Holder 
(1993); Kato (1999); and Herman and Uyeyama (1999).
6. Marine scientist Diana Reiss (1990) refers to dolphins as “an alien intelligence” and ob-
serves that “the dolphin is a superb model for helping us formulate ways of describing and 
understanding intelligence in nonhuman species” (p. 32). See also “Cognitive Cousins” (Reiss, 
2011, pp.168–189).
7. See Wise (2000, 2002).
8. See Wise (2002), “Phoenix and Ake” (pp. 131–158).
9. The following is his characterization of that position:
Commonly the arguments run something like this. Some particular human capacity is made the
object of enquiry: the capacity for having thoughts, or beliefs, or the ability to act for reasons, or
the power to frame and use concepts. And it is then shown how, contrary to the views of some
philosophical predecessor, the human exercise of this particular capacity involves the posses-
sion and use of language. It is finally further concluded that, because nonhuman animals do not
possess language, or at least the requisite kind of language, they must also lack the capacity or
ability or power in question. So it has been argued variously that nonhuman animals cannot have
thoughts, must lack beliefs, cannot act for reasons and in their encounters with the objects of
their experience must be innocent of concepts. (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 13)
See also “Can Animals Without Language Have Beliefs?” (MacIntyre, 1999, pp. 29–41).
10. MacIntyre writes,
Consider now the full range of powers that have been ascribed to dolphins by some of those 
with most opportunity to interact with them: not only powers of perception, perceptual atten-
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tion, recognition, identification and reidentification, but also of having and exhibiting desire and 
emotion, of making judgments, of intending this and that, of directing their actions towards ends 
that constitute their specific goods and so having reasons for acting as they do. But if we are 
justified in making all these ascriptions, we are presumably also justified in ascribing thoughts 
and beliefs to dolphins. It would be difficult then to avoid the further conclusion that dolphins 
possess certain concepts and know how to apply them. And at this point therefore the whole 
range of philosophical arguments whose conclusion is a denial that animals without language can 
have thoughts, beliefs, reasons for actions or concepts confront us. Yet before we can consider 
what the bearing of each of the particular arguments is on the interpretation of dolphins and 
other animal behavior we need first to ask what their authors have meant or mean by “language.” 
(MacIntyre, 1999, p. 27)
11. Bernd Würsig (1983) describes a striking example of complex, cooperative feeding by
dusky dolphins in an area of 10 to 20 square kilometers (ca. 6–12 square miles) of the South 
Atlantic. Up to 30 small groups of 6 to 15 dolphins live in this area. When a group finds a school 
of anchovies, it herds the fishes into a ball against the surface and apparently signals other groups 
of dolphins. More than 300 dolphins may ultimately get involved and behave cooperatively. 
Würsig (1983) writes,
 Dolphin cooperation appears to extend throughout the herding and feeding episode. Dolphins 
apparently take turns going through the fish school to feed, while others keep the fish school 
tightly packed. I can argue that the prey is never truly secured, for if all dolphins rushed in to take 
a bite, surely the school would scatter and each individual dolphin would obtain less food than by 
cooperating. Such cooperation must require a highly refined communication, so that particular 
individuals do not unduly, either unwittingly or purposefully, take advantage of the situation and 
try to grab more fish and spend less time herding the fish than others. It is likely that dolphins 
know each other well enough to control the situation.
 Herding and holding prey are not a stereotyped series of actions. At times, the fish school may 
fragment into smaller balls. When that occurs, a few of the dolphins break off from the group 
and herd the fish back into the central fish school. It is a dynamic, ever-changing system, which 
may require organization by these large-brained and communicative social animals. Differential 
role-playing and premeditation (such as a decision that certain members do particular things in 
order to meet various contingencies) may be important in this kind of cooperation. The degree 
of behavioral flexibility to encompass novel situations appears well developed. (pp. 5–6)
It is also worth noting that in order to keep the anchovies from scattering and escaping, the dusky 
dolphins must restrain any desire to swim through the ball and feed until it is tight enough, and 
they must also take turns managing the ball while their companions feed.
12. See, for example, Lori Marino (2002).
13. On long-term relationships and grieving behavior, see, for example, Denise Herzing (2000,
2011).
14. MacIntyre’s discussion ultimately proves nothing about dolphins’ cognitive abilities. I
take MacIntyre’s argument essentially to be, “A being has the traits of an ‘independent practical 
reasoner’ only if it has language (If L, then T).” MacIntyre asserts that dolphins lack these traits 
(not-T), and he concludes that dolphins must then lack language (not-L). However, I believe I 
have shown that MacIntyre is incorrect in asserting that dolphins lack these traits. Hence, his 
conclusion is not warranted. And given the structure of MacIntyre’s argument, the presence of 
these traits (T) lets us draw no conclusion about linguistic abilities (L).
15. For example, Howard Garner (1999) defines intelligence as “a biopsychological potential
to process information that can be activated in a cultural setting to solve problems or create 
products that are of value in a culture” (pp. 33–34), and this could serve as at least a reasonable 
point of departure in discussing dolphins’ cognitive capabilities.
16. Wilson (1998) writes,
Co-evolution . . . implies more than what we recognize as the multilevel interrelatedness of 
complex ecological systems. On their own evolutionary time scale, biologic systems can and will 
modify each other and themselves, and they can do so at any anatomical, functional, or hierarchical 
level. It is this open-ended, sometimes rapid, sometimes glacially protracted, experience-driven 
process of recursive molding and remodeling of organs, organisms, and organic processes that is 
meant by the term “co-evolution.” (p. 169)
17. I have attempted to provide such an objective analysis in my In Defense of Dolphins (2007).
18. The most recent example of the kind of mistake that comes from insufficient familiar-
ity with the scientific research is in a remark about dolphins Martha Nussbaum makes in her 
contribution to The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Discussing mirror self-recognition in 
nonhuman animals (an important indicator of self-awareness), Nussbaum (2011) writes that 
“until now, this level of complexity has been found only in apes and humans, though there is 
one ambiguous experiment with dolphins” (p. 229). However, the work of Ken Marten, Lori 
Marino, and Diana Reiss has conclusively demonstrated mirror self-recognition. See Marten 
and Psarakos (1995a, 1995b); Marino, Reiss, and Gallup (1995); and Reiss and Marino (2001).
19. Herzing’s research organization, based in Jupiter, Florida, is the Wild Dolphin Project.
In 1995, I was invited to serve as a scientific adviser to the project. For Herzing’s reflection on 
the first 25 years of her study of this community of dolphins, see her Dolphin Diaries (2011).
20. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail all of the weaknesses to which a partial un-
derstanding of the scientific literature on dolphins or a lack of field experience could lead. In 
this article, I have tried to suggest that a weak grasp of the significance of adaptation can lead to 
a faulty belief that intelligence will manifest itself the same way in all species and to an overem-
phasis on the importance of human language as the standard to determine higher intelligence 
and moral standing. Other problems include the fact that it is impossible to understand the 
nature of dolphin social intelligence without observing dolphin social behavior in their natural 
state. Similarly, failure to understand the differences in the structures of human and dolphin 
brains can lead one to misrepresent the philosophical significance of certain scientific measures 
(such as the encephalization quotients of the human and dolphin brains).
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